RESPONSE FROM THE UWE TO THE GOVERNMENT’S SUBMISSIONS ON THE MERITS

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RESPONSE TO THE SUBMISSIONS ON THE MERITS

In : Groupe Européen des Femmes Diplômées des Universités, GEFDU
University Women of Europe, UWE

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v. : Cyprus
I. PROCEDURE

University Women of Europe, UWE / le Groupe Européen des Femmes Diplômées des Universités, GEFDU, lodged a collective complaint against Cyprus on 24 August 2016 regarding two violations of the European Social Charter:

- Firstly, concerning the lack of equal pay for women and men for equal, similar or comparable work,
- Secondly, concerning the under-representation of women in decision-making posts in private companies.

The respondent state, Cyprus, represented by Ms Natalia Andreou, Government Agent, Ministry of Labour, Welfare and Social Insurance, requested in its observations on admissibility dated 13 December 2016 that the European Committee of Social Rights declare the collective complaint by UWE inadmissible.

By letter dated 31 January 2017, Mr Henrik Kristensen, Deputy Executive Secretary of the European Committee of Social Rights, invited UWE to submit a response to the states’ observations by 28 February 2017. The same day, UWE requested equal treatment with the states in terms of receiving translations of the observations so as to avoid any misinterpretations. On 22 February, UWE was notified that the deadline for submitting the responses was extended to one month after transmission of the French translation of the observations. The French translation was sent on 23 February 2017.

UWE submitted its response to the respondent state’s observations on admissibility on 19 March 2017. On 17 May 2017, Cyprus submitted a further response to UWE’s observations on admissibility.

On 4 July 2017, during its 293rd Session, the European Committee of Social Rights “declare[d] the complaint admissible in respect of Articles 1, 4, 20 and E of the Charter”.

The European Committee of Social Rights “invite[d] the Government to make written submissions on the merits of the complaint by 13 October 2017”. This deadline was extended to 3 November 2017 by letter dated 21 September 2017. On 12 October 2017, Cyprus submitted its submissions on the merits in English; the deadline for UWE’s response was set at 21 December 2017. In its submissions on the merits, the respondent state held that the collective complaint by UWE should be declared unfounded and that Cyprus complied with the provisions of the Charter.

On 17 October 2017, UWE requested that the time-limit for its response should run from the date of receipt of the French translation of the government’s submissions, which was agreed to, and the deadline was accordingly extended to 12 January 2018.

The European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC, intervened in the procedure on 3 November 2017 and submitted substantive observations on the merits (ETUC, § 114 et seq.):
“This collective complaint – as all the other 14 complaints concerning the same issues – is of great importance for the full realisation of the very fundamental right of women to non-discrimination. In particular, the continuous denial of equal pay for work of equal value is one of the fundamental problems which still remain in European societies.

From the ETUC’s point of view it is necessary to come to the following conclusions of a violation of Article 20 of the Charter in relation to

- the Gender pay gap in its substantive (see above II.C.1.a)) and procedural dimensions (see above II.C.1.b)) as well as in relation to

- the under-representation of women in decision-making bodies also in its substantive (see above II.C.2.a)) and procedural (see above II.C.2.b)) dimensions.

The Committee might thereby also in particular consider to take account of the recommendations/observations/concerns expressed by the international bodies referred to in II.A. addressed to the respondent state”.

UWE takes account of these observations and refers to them. UWE also reiterates the points in its complaint of 24 August 2016.

While Cyprus has not ratified Article 4§3 of the Social Charter, the other articles covered by this complaint are clearly applicable. The respondent state must therefore note that in accepting Article 20 of the Charter providing for equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment without discrimination on the grounds of sex, parties undertake to promote application thereof in the fields of terms of employment and working conditions, including remuneration. Cyprus has accepted the same obligations as those which would have resulted from acceptance of Article 4§3, as the concept of non-discrimination in matters of employment and occupation necessarily includes that of equal pay, not only for equal work but also for work of equal value, and the Charter cannot lay down two categories of provisions with the same purpose but different content and, still less, after the former, a provision that is less demanding. Contrary to what is maintained in the respondent state’s submissions, UWE is not complaining about Article 4§5.

In view of the observations in response, the European Committee of Social Rights will find violations of the Social Charter in respect of the aforementioned Articles 1, 20 and E on account of the lack of equal pay for women and men for equal, similar or comparable work and the under-representation of women in decision-making posts in private companies.

II. THE OVERALL ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT STATE

The European Committee of Social Rights regularly reiterates the following:

“The Charter was envisaged as a human rights instrument to complement the European Convention on Human Rights. It is a living instrument dedicated to certain values which inspired it: dignity, autonomy, equality, solidarity and other generally recognised values. It must be interpreted so as to give life and meaning to fundamental social rights” (FIDH v. France, Complaint No. 14/2003, 8 September 2004, § 27, 29; DCI v. the Netherlands, Complaint No. 47/2008, 20 October 2009, § 34).
It was in this spirit of promoting dignity, autonomy, equality and solidarity so as to give life and meaning to fundamental social rights that UWE lodged this collective complaint concerning female workers in Europe and, more particularly, in the respondent state. These women are still waiting for equal pay for women and men and to be able to hold decision-making posts in line with their abilities on an equal footing with men.

There is total unanimity among all information sources and academic publications, all public and private research conducted at national, European or international level and communicated in whatever form, the statistics produced by the respondent states themselves and those from other states, and the reports by the ILO, the CEDAW, the various national, European and international institutions, as well as various forums and colloques, that pay for women and men is unequal in all countries and that women are under-represented in decision-making posts.

The outlook of the world in which European men and women currently live is still, as ever, exclusively masculine.

Even though equality in wage terms is a driving force for the economy, even though the now-quantified cost of the violence against women in terms of unequal pay may represent a very large share of national budgets and even though remedying this would help to empower women and to combat this terrible scourge in our societies, equal pay for equal work and equal representation in decision-making posts are both sorely lacking in Cyprus.


In 2016, Cyprus was ranked 84th on the global gender gap index (ibid., p. 11).

In 2017, it fell back to 92nd place (http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf, p. 11).

No country in Europe meets the requirements of the Social Charter, in terms either of equal pay for women and men for equal, similar or comparable work or of the representation of women in decision-making posts, according to an analysis from July 2017 by the European Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination entitled “The enforcement of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value” (http://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4466-the-enforcement-of-the-principle-of-equal-pay-for-equal-work-or-work-of-equal-value-pdf-840-kb).


“1. Improving the application of the equal pay principle
2. Combating segregation in occupations and sectors
3. Breaking the glass ceiling: initiatives to combat vertical segregation
4. Tackling the care penalty
5. Better valorising women’s skills, efforts and responsibilities
6. Fighting the fog: uncovering inequalities and stereotypes
7. Alerting and informing about the gender pay gap
8. Enhancing partnerships to tackle the gender pay gap

The 1919 Versailles Treaty, on which the League of Nations was founded, provided the following (Article 427, § 7): “The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value” (https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_International_Labour_Office#Article_427)

In 2017, this principle is still not respected for all female workers in Europe.

You have to be very far removed from the reality of life in a private company to be unaware of the sense of betrayal felt by women who are underpaid on account of their gender. The vast majority of these women end up resigning themselves to the violations of their fundamental rights because criticising the violations is not well received in the companies themselves, in their families, among their friends or, in many cases, by the judicial system. When women workers actually notice pay gaps (although they are hardly ever able to prove them), the differences are often presented to them as being linked to them as individuals, their more limited performance, their more limited ability, their more limited flexibility or their more limited communication – always something more limited. Accordingly, very few women decide to bring legal proceedings against their employers.

Any attempts to bring such proceedings usually come up against refusal by the employers to answer requests for information, a lack of testimonies from colleagues and a lack of support from staff representatives. The relevant information is only rarely sought out by the authorities which have the power to do so. While proceedings may be successful, this will be after years of painful, time-consuming, costly and uncertain struggles. In the event of successful proceedings, employers are usually annoyed at having to pay out potentially large sums and harbour grudges against female employees who dared to bring proceedings. That is a fact. It is therefore necessary to warn women workers who are willing to bring such proceedings about the future risks of dismissal, usually for other reasons, as penalties generally apply here in many respondent states. That is common knowledge, although it is denied by Cyprus in its observations, which shows how wide the gap is between governments and practices on the ground.

“Individual proceedings are hard to bear psychologically. Women who do go ahead take great risks and they must be protected” (Rachel Silvera, article in French, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/03/06/rachel-silvera-la-peur-de-la-sanction-est-un-axe-de-lutte-fort-pour-l-equalite-salariale-hommes-femmes_4378483_3224.html#3EeScStlwvXdOyTd.99).

With regard to equal pay and treatment, a Belgian flight attendant, Gabrielle Defrenne, was one of the first women to bring such proceedings, demonstrating great courage and perseverance. She appealed to the Brussels Employment Tribunal in 1970; the proceedings finally ended 10 years later (Cass. 3e ch., 5 May 1980, Pas., 1980, 1095).
through the domestic and European courts. Is that what states expect from the millions of short-changed women workers? Must they bring proceedings lasting ten years at their own expense?

At best, states tell women that they have all the rights they need but fail to assert them, so it is their fault if their pay is lower than their male counterparts’. This is a ruthless syllogism.

2.1. The conclusions of conformity

The respondent state seeks to rely on the conclusions of conformity concerning Article 20 issued regarding its policy by the European Committee of Social Rights during recent supervision cycles in 2014 and 2016. The fact that the European Committee of Social Rights did not during those supervision cycles find that the policies implemented failed to comply with the Charter does not mean that its analysis covered all the aspects raised by this complaint, in particular because it did not have adequate information for that purpose and for the cause to be heard.

Accordingly, the European Committee of Social Rights may acknowledge that the standards in question are in line with the Social Charter but that the practices are disappointing or derisory and are therefore unacceptable. Moreover, the respondent state emphasises that it responded satisfactorily to the three or four requests by the Committee for more information. However, the Committee did not request additional information regarding other subjects where that was necessary. The submissions by Cyprus in this respect must therefore be regarded as irrelevant.

2.2. The nature of the respondent state’s obligations

The respondent state against which UWE has lodged a complaint reiterates in its submissions, probably on a concerted basis with other respondent states, the idea already put forward in the observations on admissibility, and which did not achieve the desired aim at that stage, whereby the Charter does not impose an obligation of results but merely of means – or, to put this another way but with the same effect, only imposes an obligation of results in terms of passing legislation that meets the requirements of the Charter and possibly setting up institutions to ensure its enforcement, but not in terms of achieving the objectives set.

This is completely at odds with the established case law of the European Committee of Social Rights, which incidentally is cited by some countries, whereby the Social Charter is only complied with, admittedly subject to some exceptions, if legislation in line with its requirements is introduced. That is not enough, however.

In this connection, it is only necessary to refer to the European Committee of Social Rights’ well-established case law (International Commission of Jurists v. Portugal, Collective Complaint No. 1/1998, 9 September 1999; European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) v. France, Complaint No. 39/2006, 5 December
States also know that they must provide the means of ensuring steady progress towards achieving the goals laid down by the Charter (Autism-Europe v. France, Complaint No. 13/2002, 4 November 2003, §53). The Committee wishes to emphasise that implementation of the Charter requires states parties not merely to take legal action but also to make available the resources and introduce the operational procedures necessary to give full effect to the rights specified therein. It points out that states parties must take steps to achieve the objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time, with measurable progress and making maximum use of available resources.

The Committee further stresses that the rights recognised in the Social Charter must take a practical and effective, rather than purely theoretical, form (International Movement ATD Fourth World v. France, Complaint No. 33/2006, 5 December 2007, § 60 to 67):

“This means that, for the situation to be in conformity with the treaty, states party must:

a) adopt the necessary legal, financial and operational means of ensuring steady progress towards achieving the goals laid down by the Charter,

b) maintain meaningful statistics on needs, resources and results,

c) undertake regular reviews of the impact of the strategies adopted,

d) establish a timetable and not defer indefinitely the deadline for achieving the objectives of each stage,

e) pay close attention to the impact of the policies adopted on each of the categories of persons concerned, particularly the most vulnerable”.

The fact that a set of relatively formal legal documents (constitution, laws, etc.) prohibit all gender discrimination and provide that equal treatment must be ensured in practice does not mean that the relevant provisions are actually implemented. Likewise, explicit or implicit references to integrated policies, synergies or networks do not mean that approaches of that kind take hold. Vagueness is not acceptable.

The legislation must therefore produce sufficient effects, through appropriate monitoring and administrative supervision mechanisms that are reasonably regular and effective and judicial remedies that are accessible and reliable, i.e. which are not too expensive and do not involve excessively complex proceedings and are based on rules of evidence consistent with the provisions of the EU directives on discrimination, which the European Committee of Social Rights has held should be regarded as applicable for meeting the requirements of the Charter, in the same way as the concept of indirect discrimination, the provision of evidence for which requires applicants to have access to comparative information that does not identify individuals but provides sufficient insight into the treatment of colleagues or other categories of workers, in order to provide the courts with enough indications for the burden of proof to be placed on the defendants.

Those bringing proceedings must also be protected against any kind of retaliatory measures. Discounting these very ordinary and routine day-to-day retaliatory measures means being very unfamiliar with these issues in the daily lives of women workers.

At the same time, there must be systematic awareness-raising for all parties concerned with the issue of gender equality in employment, pay and positions of responsibility, and the
necessary funding must be provided for support measures, in particular, childcare options and all work-life balance measures capable of compensating for the stickiness in representation and the distribution of social roles.

Lastly, irrespective of the indicators showing the final outcomes in terms of gender equality of all the strategies implemented, the results achieved by the various mechanisms must give rise to reliable statistics concerning the action taken: number of checks performed, cases processed by the courts, offences found, penalties imposed and compensation measures ordered by administrative or judicial bodies such as employment tribunals and civil and criminal courts. Neither reducing matters to criminal law nor going too far in the direction of decriminalisation is acceptable. Training for judges, police officers, labour inspectors and other groups is also vital. The EU has produced best practice guides in this connection (http://www.equineteurope.org/IMG/pdf/handbook_on_equal_pay_-_electronic_version-2.pdf).

In the present case, the information provided by the respondent state – and it is odd that the submissions made regarding the complaints in question criticise the general nature of the complaints while the state itself mostly only makes general comments – still merely takes the form of a description of the legal and institutional framework, there being a general lack of clarifications which could serve to determine the conformity of the policies followed with the requirements of the Charter. This prevents proper assessment regarding the following:

- the relevant powers, staffing levels, numbers of checks, funding, administrative supervisory bodies
- the efficiency of judicial regulation, proceedings, costs, independence, reliability
- the scale of supporting and awareness-raising policies and their proportionality in relation to the seriousness of the stereotypes to be eradicated
- the relevance and accuracy of the figures and statistics supplied, if any, which are mostly too broad or too limited whereas there are public documents from another source which provide more sophisticated or more extensive information
- the lack of a timetable for the measures introduced, the expected evaluation of the results within given timeframes
- case law in the country does not have the expected impact

The wide range of relevant bodies between which powers that in any case are limited are shared in a manner probably unclear to the women workers concerned is less a sign of dynamism than of dispersion of the efforts made.

It is accordingly in vain that the respondent state, having failed to provide the above-mentioned clarifications either directly or by making specific reference to other accessible and informative sources, refers insistently to the recent adoption of a new body of rules and the recent setting up of new institutions.

However promising they may be, these initiatives do not allow the conclusion that the state concerned has succeeded in meeting the requirements of the Charter. The European Committee of Social Rights has always held that it could not regard the introduction of new rules or new institutions – for which it cannot be predicted whether or not they will produce
significant effects within a reasonable time – as contributing from the outset to the conformity of states’ policies with the Charter.

2.3. The impact of the crisis

The European Committee of Social Rights has, admittedly, consistently acknowledged that states could not all achieve the objectives set out in the Charter and, as appropriate, any national legislation for that purpose without regard being had to their social conditions, degree of economic prosperity or any adverse circumstances.

However, in the case of gender equality as in other areas, the crisis cannot serve as a pretext for totally or partially giving up the implementation, and still less the pursuit, of the objectives set out in the Charter or legislation passed to implement it, or for placing limits on the efforts involved.

In view of these requirements, the respondent state manifestly fails to meet the specific obligations of the Social Charter; there is a clear lack of resource planning and result measurement. The Social Charter is clearly violated in respect of both complaints.

III. THE COMPLAINT OF UNEQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK

3.1 The lack of appropriate measures

In its reply, the respondent state merely refers to the applicable legislation and the major public policy exercises such as the various equality plans which are vital in mobilising the various stakeholders. However, there is no sign of gender mainstreaming in the policies concerned, decision-making, access to resources, procedures and practices, methodology, implementation, monitoring or evaluation. There is no monitoring body and, above all, no checks are provided for or carried out. These are significant shortcomings.

Little or no account is taken of many areas, for instance, the courses of study chosen by women, which all too often are non-scientific and unambitious, the greater number of vocational training courses of a higher standard available for men, the large number of benefits in kind for men and the small number for women, horizontal and vertical segregation in employment, the centuries-old division of roles in the family, with no economic value being attached to the time spent on housework, forced part-time working, and failure to ensure proper work-life balance.

Given the inadequacy of the conventional tools for combating discrimination and protecting victims, the respondent state has failed to take appropriate measures, in particular with regard to a number of points examined below.

- The employment equality policy is not fully effective. In its submissions, the state indicates the following: “The Legislation further provides that employers are obliged to promote the equal pay principle in a planned and systematic way in the workplace, and in this direction, are encouraged to provide at least once a year, or at intervals agreed between them and their employees’ representatives, with appropriate information on equal pay between men and women. Such information may include an overview of the percentages of men and
women at different levels of the organisation; their pay and pay differentials; and possible measures to improve the situation in co-operation with employees’ representatives” (respondent state’s submissions, p. 5).

“Because of the liberal and voluntary nature of the Cyprus industrial relations system, measures for fulfilling the above-mentioned obligation have not been strictly defined in the Legislation” (respondent state’s submissions, p. 5). That is not in line with the requirements of the Social Charter.


- **Protection against discrimination and promotion of equality**: Cyprus indicates that the “legislation itself provides for the reversal of the burden of proof, in both judicial and extra-judicial proceedings. Specifically, the Legislation provides that in any judicial proceedings (except for criminal proceedings) and provided that the plaintiff who alleges to have been prejudiced by the contravention of the provisions of the Legislation, presents real facts which substantiate the contravention, the Court shall oblige his adverse party to prove that there has been no contravention of the Law. As regards the extra-judicial protection, the Legislation provides that when a complaint is submitted to the Ombudsman, and given that the complainant presents real facts which substantiate the contravention, the Ombudsman shall oblige the person against whom the complaint is directed to prove that there has been no contravention of the Law” (respondent state’s submissions, p. 6).

However, the impact of such reversal of the burden of proof is unknown. In the EU report on Cyprus, it can be seen clearly that victims are afraid of losing their jobs if they bring proceedings: “In 2013 and 2014, the number of employment-related complaints to the Equality Body dropped almost by half compared to previous years and thereafter remained at low levels, which is attributed to the rising unemployment and the fear of victims that they may lose their jobs if they complain. From the body of decisions emerging in recent years, it appears that the more vulnerable the groups the less access they have to judicial or equality body proceedings. Thus most anti-discrimination claims brought before the Court are filed by civil servants regarding promotions, pensions and retirement ages.” (European Network of Legal Experts, Country report, Non-discrimination, 2017, p. 9; http://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4399-cyprus-country-report-non-discrimination-2017-pdf-2-17-mb).

The respondent state indicates that “the Equality Committee provides free of charge independent assistance (legal aid) to the victims of discrimination on the grounds of sex covering the costs for legal proceedings, in order for them to present their case before the court and claim damages. The Committee provided legal aid in 16 cases since it has been active” (respondent state’s submissions, p. 7). If this is referring to the committee set up in 2007, the granting of legal aid in 16 cases is a very low figure for discrimination proceedings which, moreover, concerned discrimination in the broad sense.

In addition, “the Government notes that since 2010, two complaints have been submitted to the office of the Ombudsman and both have been dealt with, within the remit of the
Ombudsman’s mandate. The Ombudsman is not mandated to act of his own accord in investigations relating to the equal pay between women and men for the same work or for work of equal value” (respondent state’s submissions, p. 10). Two complaints in seven years – we cannot but conclude that the system is not effective.

The country report cited above states the following: “The limited resources allocated to the equality body has led to delays in investigating of complaints of up to three to four years; by then third party rights may have been created, rendering justice for the victim impossible, whilst the victim meanwhile becomes time-barred from applying to the courts. No binding decision was ever issued by the Equality Body and no sanction was ever imposed; in the majority of cases, the equality body prefers to use its mediation function, as sanctions are too low to act as a deterrent. In each annual report, the Equality Body dedicates a special section to describe its mediation efforts, setting out a number of examples of successful mediation (ibid., p 9).

The effectiveness of the measures implemented is limited.

“The additional functions/mandate extensions assigned to the Equality Body/Ombudsman without an increase in its budget has led to considerable delays in decision making, to the extent that the effectiveness and impact of the institution is now at question. The freezing in recruitments to the public sector, imposed as a result of the economic crisis, has meant that it cannot hire personnel even if only to replace those who resign from the service. Many of the officers of the Equality Body are not legally trained, which is reflected in the reports published” (ibid., p 10).

The funding proposed here has remained stable compared to previous levels.

No progress can be made towards achieving equal pay and combating discrimination in these circumstances.

- **Lack of supervision**: The respondent state refers to the remedies in place, in particular the possibility of action by labour inspectors, but does not prove the effectiveness of any action taken here. It refers to a yearly target of around 200 investigations (respondent state’s submissions, p. 5). In practice, however, how many investigations into equal pay are carried out, analysed and followed up by action?

The European Committee of Social Rights likes to have information on the number and content of the checks conducted by labour inspectorates, on economic and social data and funding. Where are the relevant statistics by gender? How many reports were drawn up? How many cases were referred to the courts at the instigation of labour inspectors?

Far from accepting the situation submitted to it for examination, the European Committee of Social Rights itself stated the following during the last supervision cycle: “the Committee repeats its request that information is to be provided to the question raised in its previous Conclusion, namely to monitor regularly the employment policies with a view to increasing their effectiveness.”

In its observations, the ETUC states (ETUC, § 107 & 108): “Moreover, from a procedural
perspective, it appears evident that there is also a violation as the result of eliminating the gender pay gap is not achieved. In particular, it is obvious that the general framework for the supervision of the satisfactory application of the principle of equal pay is insufficient:

- in principle, the labour inspectorate should (be able to) ensure the satisfactory application of this important principle; despite the fact that the respondent State has ratified ILO Convention No. 81 on labour inspection it is obvious that this is not the case (in particular taking into account the nearly total lack of supervision in the SMEs);

- all other means to ensure the satisfactory application of the principle of equal value have proven insufficient.

From the point of view of the ETUC this illustrates that there is a violation of Article 20 of the Charter also from the procedural perspective”

UWE agrees with the ETUC.

- Lack of evaluation: As already mentioned, there is a lack of evaluation of the action taken, and the respondent state’s submissions provide no clarification here. How many appeals have there been concerning wage discrimination? How many of these have been dismissed for lack of evidence? How many cases have been referred and on what criteria? How many investigations have been conducted in companies? How many times has the Ombudsman taken action concerning specific issues here?

The Committee regularly asks for updated information on the concrete measures and activities implemented to promote gender equality, particularly with regard to equal pay for work of equal value, and to reduce the gender pay gap, along with information on the results achieved in both the public and private sectors, but hardly any such information is to be found in the opposing submissions.

- The measures implemented do not concern small enterprises: The ETUC’s observations point out that the official statistics exclude small enterprises, making it possible arbitrarily to indicate better wage equality figures: “From a substantive perspective, there are at least the following elements which should (at least in combination) lead to a violation of Article 20 ESC: Statistical evidence (see above para. 100) shows that there is still a gender pay gap. Even if it might have been reduced during the last time any Gender pay gap does not fulfil the non-discrimination requirement based on sex. The official statistics are still excluding small (micro) sized enterprises. It is therefore most probable that the Gender pay gap is even higher in these enterprises. From the point of view of the ETUC this illustrates that there is a violation of Article 20 of the Charter from the substantive perspective” (ETUC § 105 & 106).

UWE again agrees with the ETUC.

3.2. Statistical data

The respondent state’s submissions include only very few relevant and reliable figures. UWE has referred to women who may wish to make complaints finding it hard or impossible to
obtain comparative data concerning the wages paid. Several respondent states pretend not to understand the nature of the complaint and present irrelevant arguments concerning the risks of breaches of the principle of the confidentiality of personal data or powers which labour inspectorates allegedly have to obtain the necessary information. However, what these powers actually involve remains obscure and no figures are provided on cases where they are used.

The principle of confidentiality which the country apparently wishes to employ at least in part, but to an extent that is hard to assess, has never prevented the prohibition of discrimination between workers, the punishment of such discrimination by various procedures, the nullity of contracts which breach the prohibition or appropriate compensation.

It is no more acceptable, whether with regard to the gender pay gap or balanced participation of women and men in decision-making in private companies or indeed public bodies, for a country to use the pretext of being close to the European average for not having to make improvements in areas where its performance is only average.

The issue which all the complaints lodged by UWE seek to raise very deliberately is the persistence of a very low actual level of practical results, in spite of the protestations of good will, in most of the countries where the complaints are calling for the situation to be reviewed.

The same difficulties occur in all countries. “There is a difficulty in all countries in terms of objective measurement of income inequality. All tools are constructs based on standards set by statisticians. Is that to say that you can make figures say what you like? Certainly not, but if a social phenomenon is to be fully understood, it is necessary properly to grasp the tools used to measure it, including their upsides and downsides. Yet there is usually a great poverty of public debate on this subject. Of course, the tools have a political dimension, which is sometimes not properly mastered, but that is another story”, conclusions of an article in French (Observatoire des Inégalités, 29 August 2016, “Comment mesurer les inégalités de revenus” (https://www.inegalites.fr/Comment-mesurer-les-inegalites-de-revenus).

Governments must provide relevant statistical data, and they must compare the actual situation with the requirements to be achieved, the resources employed and the results obtained. The respondent state makes choices so that one or other criterion is included in its statistics and others are excluded in an attempt to conceal greater wage inequality than it admits to. However, the respondent state does acknowledge that there is inequality; that has to be noted.

3.3. Structural effects and stereotypes

Whatever the case, the existence of structural effects, the impact of stereotypes that are hard to change or the complexity of the reasons for the persistent pay gap or differences in career development between men and women cannot serve as excuses for lack of progress towards meeting the requirements of the Charter.

From this point of view, the concentration of female and male workers in different sectors, with particularly large numbers of women in the education and health and social sectors, is not acceptable as an argument for justifying the pay gaps noted when the Charter refers to equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.
It is clear that a key issue when it comes to meeting this obligation is that of classifications. Several, but not all, countries refer specifically to the issue, although in unfortunately obscure terms. What are the criteria for the classifications and for which occupations are non-neutral classifications accepted? We are left in the dark.

- **Classification systems:** With regard to classifications, Cyprus (respondent state’s submissions, p. 8) refers to projects under way here. Cyprus says nothing about the component elements or characteristics of this instrument, or about the pay gap calculation method for firms, thereby making it impossible to assess the latter’s relevance in terms of exonerating itself for SMEs escaping the legislation that applies to larger companies. There would therefore appear to be a violation of the Charter in their case.

Gender bias is omnipresent. For instance, the workers of a municipal parks department, who are all male, are paid a bonus, but not the employees of a municipal welfare centre’s kindergartens and nurseries, who are all female; the same could apply in a big private company. An employer of good will who was aware of classifications and their harmful effects would have been able to ensure balance in the physical or mental strain experienced by his or her employees. Nobody would have had a bonus or everybody would have had one.

There would appear to be a lack of occupational categories with clearly defined classification criteria, and the pitfalls here have not yet been properly addressed. This issue should not just be dealt with through collective bargaining if major progress is to be made. It is clearly a responsibility of governments.

The Shadow Report for the CEDAW Committee by the platform of Cypriot associations states the following:

“What is important and not reflected by statistics on employment and which has a direct effect on levels of poverty and social exclusion of women is the striking pay gap between men and women, which is now at 21% and is one of the widest in Europe. Given the high employment rates of men and women, high educational achievements of women, and the relatively low proportion of part-time work, the explanation for the wage gap lies with the continuing gender segregation in employment. The gendered division of employment in Cyprus is one of the largest in the EU and has important implications for the wage gap; with women predominating in the lower paid sectors of health and education, and home care services.

- Out of all employed women in Cyprus, the sectors of wholesale and retail concentrate the highest proportions with 18.4%, followed by education and health with 17.6%.
- In private households, the vast majority (97%) are women, while the construction sector 9 in 10 employees are men.
- In the areas of health and education, 3 out of 4 employed persons are women.
- In the industrial sector 7 out of 10 employed persons are men.

The gendered division of employment in Cyprus is largely due to gender stereotypes and traditional cultural expectations and educational choices, as well as the efforts of women to balance family and professional life.
With the greater participation of women in labour market and in education, one would expect a corresponding improvement in the representation of women in leadership positions.”

(http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/CYP/INT_CEDAW_NGO_CYP_13225_E.pdf, p. 18)

Two other key issues regarding equal pay are the overall pay gap and the context in which the gap is assessed.

- **The pay gap**: the respondent state advances an argument which is in part intrinsically contradictory and in part incompatible with the arguments put forward by the other countries. Some of the statistics available, in particular the Eurostat indicator, group together – under conditions which must be clear, failing which confusion is generated – three separate phenomena: pay gaps proper; the number of hours worked during a period of employment and hence part-time work; and the consequences of stopping work for various reasons, including bringing up children, with the periods out of employment varying depending on the duration of and level of compensation for parental, maternity and paternity leave.

In February 2017, the Eurostat figures for the EU-28 for contributions to the gender overall earnings gap were as follows (Eurostat, Gender Statistics, Statistics explained http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Gender_statistics)

- The gender pay gap: 37.4%
- The gender hours gap: 30.5%
- The gender employment rate gap: 32.1%

In February 2017, in the case of Cyprus:

- The gender pay gap: 48.6%
- The gender hours gap: 13.5%
- The gender employment rate gap: 37.9%


The ETUC’s observations state the following: “According to the Commission, based on Eurostat 2014 figures, in Cyprus the gender pay gap stands at 14.2% (the average gender pay gap in the EU is 16.7%) and the gender overall earnings gap in Cyprus stands at 26.6% (the average gender overall earnings gap in the EU is 39.8%)” (ETUC, § 98).

To assess the reality of this pay gap, it must therefore be corrected or refined with other indicators and data. The indicator which the government relies on is probably calculated on the basis of hourly wages and therefore does not show the wage inequalities relating to the
fact that women are much more likely to be confined to part-time work than men. It surely does not have to be repeated that in almost half the cases workers do not choose voluntarily to work part-time; it is forced on them. There has been stagnation in relation to this indicator in recent years.

- **The impact of parental leave**: The Cypriot government also does not analyse the impact on the pay gap of its choices in terms of the duration of and levels of compensation for parental leave; it has not taken action to encourage fathers to take longer parental leave. However, studies show that extending paternal leave is a key alternative to the traditional methods of combating wage discrimination (OECD, Policy Brief, March 2016; https://www.oecd.org/policy-briefs/parental-leave-where-are-the-fathers.pdf).

Recent studies, including by the OECD, show that there is a link between the length of paid maternity leave and parental leave and the size of the pay gap (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/upshot/the-gender-pay-gap-is-largely-because-of-motherhood.html).

A look at the following is sufficient here:

- A chart showing the link between the length of paid parental leave and the pay gap (https://utopiayouarestandinginit.com/2014/11/09/the-link-between-paid-parental-leave-generosity-and-a-larger-gender-pay-gap/)
- 2016 RAND study on the impact of paid parental leave, including paternal leave, on wage equality (https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1666.html)

- **Measurement of the pay gap** is also based solely on monthly wages and does not take account of fringe benefits. However, the pay gap in fringe benefits is wider than in the case of wages themselves. It is also unclear whether a distinction is made between the public and private sectors. Once again the data are not reliable. Lastly, women are over-represented in the lowest full-time gross monthly wage categories, while the proportion of men is higher in the highest categories.

- **The assessment base** must not just be an individual company but must be extended to entities forming a working environment or a technical unit for a group of workers employed by several companies, including subcontractors. The respondent state seems to be unaware of the concept of technical unit, as a result of which the scope of the regulations is very limited. Nothing is said about checks on the implementation of company reports. Likewise, the size of companies is a key assessment base and the whole range of issues is still to be addressed in many companies not covered by the legal provisions on equal pay.
It is worthwhile referring to the Committee’s conclusions setting out the principles which apply to all the respondent states (Conclusions 2016, Portugal):

“The Committee recalls that it examines the right to equal pay under Article 20 and Article 4§3 of the Charter, and does so therefore every two years (under thematic group 1 “Employment, training and equal opportunities”, and thematic group 3 “Labour rights”). Articles 20 and 4§3 of the Charter require that it be possible to make pay comparisons across companies (Conclusions 2010, France). At the very least, legislation should require pay comparisons across companies in one or more of the following situations:

- cases in which statutory rules apply to the working and pay conditions in more than one company
- cases in which several companies are covered by a collective works agreement or regulations governing the terms and conditions of employment
- cases in which the terms and conditions of employment are laid down centrally for more than one company within a holding (company) or conglomerate (Statement of Interpretation on Article 20, Conclusions 2012).

Other key variables were not taken into account in the respondent state’s submissions, although they have been covered in the work done by the ILO for forty years. In assessing a particular job, it is necessary to employ assessment grids that take account of neutral classifications and to focus on:

- The problems relating to the choice of assessment criteria and their significance
- The problems relating to the omission of certain criteria
- The problems relating to certain aspects being overemphasised
- The problems relating to the interplay of the levels and weighting of the criteria
- The problems relating to the lack of transparency in the assessment process
- The problems relating to career advancement in different employment sectors

Examples of indirect discrimination bias have been identified in job assessment and classification methods, but nothing has been done to take account of them effectively in policies. The assessment and classification methods used may not include the following:

- The criteria employed to assess jobs
- The application of these criteria in the weighting and ranking of jobs.

For instance, the responsibility recognised in a particular job is often financial or relates to line management. However, other types of responsibility exist and are not taken into account, including responsibility in relation to persons who are not subordinates, to products or to data confidentiality. Other examples are problem resolution, which is neither visible nor of strategic importance, and daily issues to be resolved, with none of these being covered in classifications. While reference has already been made to physical or mental strain, there is also the issue of the multiskilling required in posts held by women not being taken on board positively, unlike the specialisation of their male colleagues’ posts.

It is clear what has to be done, so why is no corresponding action being taken? The grids included in the various plans on the initiative of the authorities are not binding.

“Some of the factors that contribute to the gender pay gap are:

- Management and supervisory positions are overwhelmingly held by men. Within each sector men are more often promoted than women, and paid better as a consequence. This trend culminates at the very top, where amongst CEOs less than 4% are women.
- Women take charge of important unpaid tasks, such as household work and caring for children or relatives on a far larger scale than men do. Working men spend on average 9 hours per week on unpaid care and household activities, while working women spend 26 hours – that’s almost 4 hours every day. In the labour market this is reflected by the fact that more than 1 in 3 women reduce their paid hours to part-time, while only 1 in 10 men do the same.
- Women tend to spend periods off the labour market more often than men. These career interruptions not only influence hourly pay, but also impact future earnings and pensions.
- Segregation in education and in the labour market; this means that in some sectors and occupations, women tend to be overrepresented, while in others men are overrepresented. In some countries, occupations predominantly carried out by women, such as teaching or sales, offer lower wages than occupations predominantly carried out by men, even when the same level of experience and education is needed.
- Pay discrimination, while illegal, continues to contribute to the gender pay gap”.

Gender mainstreaming in all cross-cutting activities is required under the European Social Fund programme for 2015-2020 and the Council of Europe Gender Equality Strategy for 2014-2017, in which the respondent state was involved. On the basis of the information supplied by states, a report was issued on 19 October 2017: “Activities and measures in member states towards the achievement of the objectives of the Council of Europe Gender Equality Strategy” (https://rm.coe.int/gec-2017-10-implementation-ge-strategy/168075df26).

- Economic losses of several billion euros: There is no justification in law for this inequality, and no economic justification either.

For some fifteen years now, studies have agreed that the various types of discrimination on the labour market are ruinous and cause huge economic losses. Reducing them would generate an increase in growth and income of roughly 3% to 4% of GDP. Putting men and women on a strictly equal footing would accordingly inject billions of euros into the economy and generate billions of euros in additional tax receipts for governments because of the collection of higher levels of employee and employer contributions and taxes. And women workers would also benefit directly in terms of their living standards.

Unfortunately, the pay gap at present is such that in 2017 female employees in Europe worked for free from 3 November to 31 December. The country is ranked 20th in terms of the widest pay gaps in Europe. Cypriot women who experience this inequality on a daily basis cannot but be disillusioned on hearing the country’s declarations of intent concerning social progress.
Female workers in Cyprus worked for free from 10 November to 31 December 2017 (http://www.slate.fr/story/127622/infographie-ecart-salaires-europe).

Since 1 January 2018, one Council of Europe member state, Iceland, has prohibited unequal pay for women and men and imposed harsh financial penalties for non-compliance. This is an example to be followed in that it both respects women’s rights and benefits everybody.

In any case, EU member states are covered by EU directives and hence the rule prohibiting indirect discrimination, breaches of which play a large part in wage gaps.

The European Committee of Social Rights will accordingly uphold the complaint and declare UWE’s action well-founded.

IV. THE UNDER-REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN DECISION-MAKING POSTS

At issue here are access by women to positions of responsibility and the promotion of genuine equality in the occupation of those posts, as well as the elimination of pay gaps for the individuals concerned, as new female board members are less well paid than their male colleagues. Although most countries have provided much information here in terms of listing the institutions involved and the meetings held in this connection, it is not possible to determine the extent to which the relevant strategies are actually conclusive or achieve the desired objectives in reasonable proportions and within short timeframes.

4.1. Women on company boards of directors


Cyprus does not have a mechanism to foster representation of women on the boards of private companies, as was explained in the complaint. Women account for 8.4% of company board members (http://www.morningstar.fr/fr/pro/api.aspx?path=cache/documentdownloads/files/8379/revisions/1/; p. 6).

According to the respondent state’s submissions, “OEB (Cyprus Employers and Industrialists Federation) has carried out specialised surveys, in order to ascertain the reasons why there are fewer women occupying such positions. The results were disseminated through press conferences and were discussed publicly. The conclusions of the surveys have been the basis of many actions undertaken by OEB in the field of gender equality. It must be noted that the majority of companies in Cyprus are small-medium sized and/or are family businesses where gender issues are not so prevalent” (p. 10).

That response is not satisfactory and will not in the long run ensure balanced representation of women and men on company boards in Cyprus.

Based on the European Commission figures, the ETUC states the following: “In April 2016,
the average share of women on the boards of the largest publicly listed companies registered in the EU-28 Member States reached 23.3%. For Cyprus, the figure is only 10.9%” (ETUC, § 100; http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_balance_decision_making/1607_factsheet_final_wob_data_en.pdf).

Clearly, progress is slow and is confined very narrowly to the largest companies in the country and to boards of directors, which again shows the responsibility of the respondent state, as also stressed by the ETUC in its observations (§ 109 to 111):

“Concerning the (under-)representation in decision-making positions within private companies this problem has only been addressed in more recent years. As developed in Part I.B.2., this is covered by Article 20 of the Charter. If there is not sufficiently clear and wide-ranging legislation and/or if the practice shows that this equality principle is not implemented sufficiently this leads from the point of view of the ETUC to finding a violation of Article 20 of the Charter.

a) Substance Statistical evidence (see above para. 100) shows that there is still an under-representation of women in decision-making bodies within private companies. Even if there might be relevant legislation and even if the degree of representation of women would have increased it is not to be disputed that women are not sufficiently represented within these bodies.

From the point of view of the ETUC this illustrates that there is a violation of Article 20 of the Charter from the substantive perspective”.

We are bound to agree with the ETUC’s observations.

4.2. The legislation does not apply to management boards

Cyprus is still at the stage of discussing what should be done to end the endemic under-representation of women in decision-making posts.

“CCCI (Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry) participates actively in the policy-making bodies dealing with gender equality issues and contributes to the promotion of the correct implementation of the existing legislation on equality, as well as the strengthening of the position of women in employment” (respondent state’s submissions, p. 10). Very few of the country’s business leaders are women: “only 8.4% of business leaders in Cyprus are women. The corresponding rate in the EU is 32.6%.”

“A double glass ceiling and a perimeter wall” and “a sticky floor” are the graphic terms used to describe the difficulties women in the country encounter in entering positions of responsibility in companies outside boards, as is reflected in the figures: “In Cyprus although 50.2% of working women hold high academic qualifications, only 27.5% of women are in decision-making positions according to a study by the University of Cyprus Field Research Centre” (respondent state’s submissions, p. 10). The figure is even lower when posts in decision-making bodies are considered as opposed to positions of responsibility.

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Cyprus violates the Social Charter on this claim of the under-representation of women in decision-making posts in business.

The collective complaint must be upheld on both claims.

V. THE COSTS INCURRED

With regard to the claims for a state whose policy is found to be in breach of the Social Charter to meet the costs incurred in bringing the collective complaints, the objection by all the respondent states, including Cyprus, is based on the idea that the European Committee of Social Rights is not a judicial authority and that there is no explicit provision in the Charter for the costs to be met. Although there is indeed no such provision, the payment of the winning party’s legal costs, as is the rule in cases before domestic courts, would be consistent with the spirit of the Charter.

Otherwise, there will be a real indirect dissuasive effect on organisations which theoretically are entitled to lodge collective complaints – as demonstrated by the fact that so few have succeeded in doing so, regardless of how much they wanted to – to put an end to numerous well-known violations of the Charter which may or may not be noted during the supervision cycles.

In addition, the collective complaints before the European Committee of Social Rights are similar in many respects to the appeals against regulatory decisions on grounds of abuse of authority which are heard in some states by administrative courts or bodies with related powers and where the public authorities are not awarded costs if the applications by natural or legal persons are dismissed. The only exception involves fines for abuses of the right of application. The claim for costs is therefore maintained.

VI. STATEMENT BY THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

It should be noted that the texts of the various pillars of the Council of Europe enshrine effective gender equality, member states have adapted their legislation and the actions, strategies, recommendations and resolutions of the Council of Europe pursue this goal.

The respondent state’s replies concerning the two complaints are not sufficiently precise. However, as it has signed up to the Charter, it falls to the respondent state to indicate what measures are taken in the country and the reasons for the persistent inequalities, the under-representation of women in decision-making posts, the random statistics, the plans which do not produce results and the lack of reports and assessments.

There is a lack of political will and practical action on the part of the respondent states of the kind women have been waiting for for so many years.

It is worth referring here to the statement by Nils Muiznieck, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, dated 20 December 2017 and entitled “Gender equality in employment is still a distant promise in Europe”, which reads as follows:
“This year once again women in Europe effectively worked without pay during the last two months in comparison to men. In addition they continued to face underrepresentation in decision-making bodies and positions. This is a gross injustice and a human rights violation. European states must tackle it much more forcefully than has been the case so far”.

“Although the situation varies from country to country, it is clear that women suffer everywhere on our continent from unequal treatment and opportunities in the workplace. It would be wrong to believe that this situation is the result of employment dynamics only. In reality, discrimination against women, be it direct or indirect, in this sphere of life results from deep-rooted societal attitudes that keep women in a subordinate role. Tackling this problem therefore requires a comprehensive approach from Council of Europe member states, from laws to be changed to political, cultural and economic measures to be implemented”.

“The role of state authorities, in particular governments and parliaments, is crucial. They must lead by example and fully implement the gender equality standards set out in international and European human rights treaties. Among them, the European Social Charter requires that state parties guarantee the principle of equal pay for work of equal value by legislation that should be implemented effectively. This includes providing for appropriate sanctions and remedies in case of gender discrimination in the workplace. Both within the public administration and in the labour market, state authorities must make more efforts to bridge the gender pay gap. They should also remove barriers that prevent women from reaching top level posts”.

“The current situation is not only harmful for women and the economy. It is deleterious for society as a whole. Even where the gender pay gap is narrowing, this is happening very slowly. If states do not step up their efforts now, it will take several more decades before full equality is achieved. We cannot afford to wait such a long time. European states must show more resolve in upholding the obligation to ensure gender equality in the employment sphere”.


ON THESE GROUNDS
AND SUBJECT TO ANY THAT MIGHT BE RAISED IN ADDITIONAL MEMORIALS OR MENTIONED AT A HEARING

The European Committee of Social Rights is asked:
• to declare the action by University Women of Europe, UWE / Groupe Européen des Femmes Diplômées des Universités, GEFDU, well-founded;
• consequently, to hold that Cyprus’s failure to ensure in practice equal pay for women and men for equal, similar or comparable work and the under-representation of women in decision-making posts in Cyprus breach the provisions of the revised European Social Charter, particularly Articles 1, 20 and E;
• to draw any factual and legal conclusions therefrom,
• consequently, to order Cyprus to pay University Women of Europe, UWE / Groupe Européen des Femmes Diplômées des Universités, GEFDU, and its counsel the sum of €10 000 excluding tax by way of an initial estimate to cover the time spent and the costs incurred in connection with these proceedings.

Without prejudice
11 January 2018